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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

PARAMILITARY STUDY GROUP MEETING

AT THE PENTAGON  
TWENTY-FIRST MEETING  
30 MAY 1961

PRESENT

GENERAL TAYLOR

COMMANDER MITCHELL

MR. KENNEDY

LT. COLONEL TARWATER

MR. DULLES (WITNESS)

ADMIRAL BURKE

SANITIZED

NLK-76-139 APPEND

BY BDM NARA DATE 10/81

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(The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made).

STATEMENT: Our conclusion has been that in view of the training there really was no feasible guerrilla alternative. However, this fact was never understood by Government officials. Consequently, they were under the false impression that going guerrilla was a realistic possibility. Would you please comment on this point?

[REDACTED] First, I would like to address the question of the training for guerrilla activity. Many of the key officers who started out originally in the program received guerrilla training. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This training was directed toward the formation of paramilitary teams for guerrilla purposes and continued until early November 1960 when the directive was issued to start training a more conventional force.

[REDACTED] Now I would like to discuss some of the training problems. There were a number of factors which made it necessary to concentrate entirely on the training for conventional warfare. One of these was the slowness of recruiting. In fact, the recruiting was stopped for a period of about two or three weeks in the autumn when they had the revolution in Guatemala, and when consideration was being given to the possibility of moving Cuban troops out of there entirely and no one knew where they could be moved to. The United States was considered and Saipan was considered, and so on.

STATEMENT: I think that is an important point. I had forgotten that the recruiting had to be suspended during that period.

QUESTION: What was that period?

[REDACTED] It was in November.

- 1 -

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COLONEL KING: It was ten days after the cable went out changing the concept of the training of the strike force.

[REDACTED] What I'm trying to show are the reasons why no further guerrilla training was or could be given. In November we were not getting any recruits, and they were coming very slowly after this until we broke a political log jam with the FRD. They were deliberately withholding recruits and were being so selective in accepting recruits that each member of the FRD would only take those that he thought would be responsive to his personal control. The next point about the training that I would like to go into was the fact that the 300 people we had in hand at that time had already been over this guerrilla training. Another pertinent factor is that in order to go into the conventional military training, we had to have trainers.

QUESTION: How long were you negotiating for those trainers, do you recall?

[REDACTED] It's in my report; however, I don't have a copy of it here. Anyway, it was January before the trainers arrived in Guatemala. By this time the recruits were coming in more rapidly. Consequently, due to the pressure of time, we had to concentrate on the barest minimum of essential subjects. There was no time for training the new people in guerrilla warfare when we barely had time to train them for the pending operation. These are the reasons why no further guerrilla training was given.

STATEMENT: It's apparent that under the terms of the requirements, you had to concentrate on conventional warfare.

[REDACTED] Going to the question of the opportunity for guerrilla warfare, the Zapata operation never offered anywhere near the possibilities for guerrilla warfare that the Trinidad plan did. We of the military staff realized that the Zapata swamp was isolated from the rest of Cuba, and if the force was unable to break out, they would not be able to take any really effective guerrilla action.

- 2 -

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STATEMENT: The President and the Secretary of State would say they were amazed that these men were captured because they felt they could get away by going guerrilla.

[REDACTED] I think we did make some representations that they could get away, but not by going guerrilla, and I think they could have been evacuated from the beachhead if we had control of the air.

STATEMENT: Yes, but if they had control of the air, you wouldn't have had a requirement for evacuation. So it's a circular argument.

[REDACTED] Well, that's right. An amphibious operation of any kind is impossible without control of the air, so we needn't even go beyond that point.

[REDACTED] I would like to say that on more than one occasion, Mr. Bissell, in presenting these alternative military plans to the members of the Cabinet and the President, emphasized the point that the Trinidad plan offered the opportunity for effective guerrilla action in contrast to the other one. This was made absolutely clear on a number of occasions.

RESPONSE: I am sure of that, but he never said that they couldn't go guerrilla in Zapata, or ever suggested that there was a minimal possibility as we are now inclined to believe.

[REDACTED] In the Zapata plan I thought of guerrilla action as being a means of saving individuals if the force was defeated, rather than believing that they could become an effective guerrilla force, because I could never see how effective guerrilla operations could be conducted from there.

QUESTION: It was explained to the President and others that this operation could not really be a failure even if the beachhead was washed out, because the invasion force could easily become guerrillas who would be an asset in the struggle against Castro. Do you think that is a correct appraisal of the situation as you saw it?

- 3 -

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[REDACTED] No, Sir, I don't. I can recall that in the evaluation of the two plans it was represented a little bit differently from that. As I recall, for example, Mr. Bissell had one or more meetings with members of the Cabinet and with the President wherein he mentioned that one of the desirable features of the Trinidad plan was that it offered this guerrilla alternative.

STATEMENT: Yes, I know he did with Trinidad, but he also made the same appraisal with regard to Zapata.

[REDACTED] I didn't think so. I don't recall hearing him say that Zapata offered good possibilities for guerrilla action.

STATEMENT: Mr. Bissell came to my office and that was the statement that he made to me, and he made it quite clear to the President. I think he recognizes this now.

[REDACTED] I recall the President's having voiced considerable concern about the Zapata operation as to what would happen if they were indeed unable to break out of that swamp area, and he asked a great many pointed questions. Could they be evacuated or what would happen to them? We did think, and we did say that a great many, but not necessarily all the troops could be evacuated from the Zapata area in the shipping that we controlled. But that of course presupposed control of the air which was a prerequisite for any amphibious operation from the outset.

QUESTION: I believe you confirmed what [REDACTED] told us, that the troops were indeed briefed that if the beachhead was penetrated they would fall back on the beach for sea evacuation and if that didn't work, then they should go guerrilla?

[REDACTED] I was not present when [REDACTED] briefed them on that. I did instruct [REDACTED] to brief the troops that if there should be a penetration in the eastern flank, where I thought

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the most likely spot was for penetration, that they should join at the Red Beach area in the west which was the most favorable area for escape and evasion and for guerrilla action. I also told him that on the other hand, should they be driven from the Red Beach area, they should all get together down toward Blue Beach. Now what he actually told them at the final briefing, I am not prepared to say as I did not attend all the briefings.

QUESTION: How was the 4th Battalion composed when it went in?

[REDACTED] The 4th Battalion was an infantry battalion trained for motorized movement.

QUESTION: You mentioned before lunch that you knew the T-33s were armed with 50 caliber machine guns; however, in the air annex of the field order they were listed as trainers. Would you say that the importance of getting these T-33s was appreciated?

[REDACTED] I think so, but I think the T-33 turned out to be a more effective aircraft than we had anticipated. I don't believe we thought they would be as dangerous to us as the B-26s.

QUESTION: Do you recall any discussion or any attempts to get any sort of fighters into the force?

[REDACTED] These T-33s couldn't fly from a carrier and the whole problem of an air base had us pretty well stymied from the outset. I don't know if you are aware of it but we really didn't know if we were going to be able to use even Puerto Cabezas until the last moment. [REDACTED] had always insisted that he be given some assurance [REDACTED] that he would be supported in case this matter came before the United Nations or the Organization of American States. As far as I know, no one at the proper level [REDACTED] ever gave him such assurance. At least it is our

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impression that none was ever given. There was also continuing opposition to using a Nicaraguan base from the State Department. So far as using a base anywhere else, we tried but we simply couldn't. Consequently, the fighters were ruled out by the fact that we couldn't get a base.

STATEMENT: I just don't see how you could expect to control the air. You were bound to have some unneutralized air.

[REDACTED] Well, let me go back further to what I thought about destroying the aircraft on the ground. I think our estimates of the operable aircraft they had was pretty accurate. We thought there was someplace between a dozen or 18 that would fly. I consulted with [REDACTED] the air people about knocking these out and they thought, without question, that they could. I thought they could too. I've seen a good many aircraft knocked out myself.

RESPONSE: Yes, I have too, but I've never seen a 100% knocked out.

[REDACTED] Yes, but I have personally seen a squadron knocked out by three fighters. I sat there and watched this done myself. I just don't know what is so difficult about strafing out a few aircraft. I thought we could knock them out and I'm surprised we didn't. I think American pilots would have knocked them out. I think a good American pilot could have totally destroyed the Castro air capability which was not a great capability.

QUESTION: Without napalm?

[REDACTED] Yes, just with machine guns.

- 6 -

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
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MR. PHILLIPS

(The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made).

STATEMENT: I would appreciate your comments on the two paragraphs we intend to include in our report on propaganda.

MR. PHILLIPS: There are only two comments generally. I feel that (1) They give the idea that the propaganda effort was much smaller than it was, and a much more restricted one. (2) They certainly intimate that propaganda activities were carried out without being coordinated with the rest of the U.S. Government. I feel that this is not correct. After the project was approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960, we analyzed our problem. We realized that we had a very tough audience to face because we had to convince the very lowest classes.



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
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- 2 -

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
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- 3 -

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[REDACTED]

MR. PHILLIPS: Some six or seven weeks before the military operation we drafted the propaganda plan in support of the military operation and this was approved one month before the operation. It was approved first by [REDACTED] and I believe Mr. Bissell also saw the paper. This plan set forth the things that we were going to do directly in support of the military operation. At this phase of the operation we turned ourselves completely over to the military and responded to their guidance rather than recommending what we thought was best.

[REDACTED]


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QUESTION: Where did you get the guidance as to the type of information you were supposed to put out?

MR. PHILLIPS: That was my job, the military would tell me their objective and I would develop the propaganda necessary to support their operation.

QUESTION: Did the State Department know what you were putting out?

MR. PHILLIPS: No, Sir.

QUESTION: Well this would seem to be a dereliction of their assigned responsibility.

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, I was in daily contact with Mr. Devine.

QUESTION: As I understand it then, in January before the new Administration came in, Mr. Loomis agreed that you had complete responsibility for the propaganda operation. Did this include both overt and covert?

MR. PHILLIPS: Covert only.

QUESTION: Would you please define your understanding of covert propaganda?

MR. PHILLIPS: When none of the propaganda can be traced to the United States Government.

QUESTION: During this period the State Department was charged with the responsibility of providing guidance, did they in fact provide this guidance?

- 5 -

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MR. PHILLIPS: They answered specific questions that we had with regard to policy, and they provided some guidance at the higher level at regular, I believe weekly meetings, on the Cuban question. Anything that developed at these meetings which pertained to propaganda was passed on to me by the CIA representative that attended the meeting. From this source we received very definite guidance, for example, to attempt to make this operation appear as an uprising rather than as an invasion.

QUESTION: Where did the figure 4000 or 5000 troops in the invasion force develop?

MR. PHILLIPS: Within the U.S. press.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the implied criticism from USIA that they never knew when or where this operation would take place?

MR. PHILLIPS: It's true that I did not inform them.

QUESTION: Why weren't they informed as to the invasion?

MR. PHILLIPS: I really can't answer that; however, they should have been.

QUESTION:

MR. PHILLIPS:

QUESTION:

MR. PHILLIPS:

MR. PHILLIPS: I have indicated that the operation was planned to be a surprise attack on the Cuban coast.

- 6 -

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MR. DULLES

(The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.)

QUESTION: Was there any doubt about the requirement for military action against Castro?

MR. DULLES: There was no doubt as far as I can recall in the mind of anyone including the White House, State, Defense, and ourselves, as to the need for action against Castro, and the feeling was that probably military action was the only kind of action that could be effective.

QUESTION: In your own mind, how did you evaluate the probability of success?

MR. DULLES: I realized the operation was a risky one; that you could not insure success; but I rated reasonably high, certainly 50% or over, the probability of being able to effect a beachhead and to hold it for a considerable period of time.

QUESTION: What was your estimate of the possibility of an uprising following the invasion?

MR. DULLES: I never gave a great deal of weight to the idea of a large popular uprising. I viewed it in this way: that if one had the beachhead and the airbases, we would then be able to resupply pockets of resistance in various parts of Cuba, thereby getting arms in the hands of a great many anti-Castro people. I don't believe in popular uprisings by unarmed people when you have a military force in being, such as the militia. I did not rate the militia very highly as an organized fighting force. It was, however, entirely effective against unarmed civilians. I never felt that we should call for an uprising or that we should expect or desire an immediate popular uprising. I had had a great deal of experience during the war in France when I was working with the French underground, and I remembered how hard we had tried to keep the French from waging frontal battles against the Germans; they would do it from time

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to time and then they would get cut to pieces and I was very much impressed with that experience.

QUESTION: You viewed the development of this operation as the maintenance of a beachhead for a rather indefinite period and then using the beachhead as a base for infiltration of additional weapons and that sort of thing?

MR. DULLES: I hoped that we could expand the beachhead and that we could spread out into areas over toward Trinidad and toward the Escambray -- that if the first encounter with the hard core of pretty well trained militia were successful, I thought we would then be in a very good position to enlarge the beachhead and to get substantial accretion. I recognized that Zapata was a very difficult area to get into, but I still thought they would be able to make contact with a more populous area and be able to build up their beachhead.

QUESTION: Were you surprised by the rate of reaction of the Castro forces?

MR. DULLES: I was surprised by the effectiveness of their aircraft. However, I realized that since we were making the invasion in an area that was relatively near Havana, and to the various tank brigades, that within possibly 15 or 20 hours, you could expect pretty effective reaction against the beachhead.

STATEMENT: Coming back to the expectation of a general uprising, Allen had a completely different view of that than the Chiefs had.

RESPONSE: Yes, I note that.

MR. DULLES: I said I did not attach importance to an immediate uprising. We were not able to call upon the people for an uprising until we had a beachhead -- until we had something for them to do, and until we armed them. I don't believe in an uprising of unarmed people when the opposition has a substantial number of armed men that can be fairly effective against unarmed civilians. I felt that what would be accomplished was a beachhead that would provide a place from which we could easily

- 2 -

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arm various pockets of resistance in the Escambray. I felt that anything like a general uprising was not in the cards and was probably not desirable initially.

QUESTION: What was your intention with regard to calling for an uprising had the beachhead been established firmly for several days?

MR. DULLES: We had no definite plan on that. It would have depended upon the effect of the invasion on the Cuban people and a good many other considerations.

STATEMENT: It might have been the pressure of the time, but I know the President kept after Dick Bissell about the uprising and Dick Bissell stated on the first day that it was going to happen that night.

MR. DULLES:

RESPONSE:

MR. DULLES: We did expect that after the landing, there would be increased [REDACTED] and we hoped there would be some defections from the militia to the underground after the landing.

STATEMENT: Well, we certainly spent a lot of effort getting extra arms ready for those that would join the force:

RESPONSE: Yes, for 30,000 men I believe it was.

MR. DULLES: That's a different thing. I thought you were talking about uprisings throughout Cuba. If you're talking about [REDACTED] and some accretion to the beachhead, particularly if they were able to break out from the beachhead, I think there probably would have been several thousand accretions

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in the beachhead merely from the population in the beachhead area, and I think the evidence we have will bear that out.

QUESTION: Were there several thousand in this beachhead?

MR. DULLES: There were pretty close to that -- I'm thinking about the civilian population as well as the military.

STATEMENT: The figure of 30,000 indicates to me that someone was planning on a massive uprising someplace; on getting people to use these weapons. Would that be a fair comment, Admiral?

ADMIRAL BURKE: Yes. We expected some accretions from the beachhead but not very many, because CIA originally had 5,000 additional arms and then the Secretary of Defense increased this.

MR. DULLES: I think that the Secretary of Defense wanted these weapons as a standby capability. I believe this was a very wise standby action that was taken.

QUESTION: What was your understanding of the attitude of the JCS on the Zapata plan?

MR. DULLES: Very much as has been reported here. They preferred Trinidad. It was my understanding however that they accepted Zapata as a possibility. One of the papers that was prepared and distributed during the high-level meetings seemed to me to indicate, and I thought it was prepared at least with the military people who were working with us, that those people thought that Zapata was in some respects better than Trinidad.

QUESTION: Is that a paper that Mr. Bissell prepared?

MR. DULLES: Yes. But those statements were all prepared with the military staff that was with us. This is the paper of the 16th of March -- two operations had been proposed -- the T operation and the Z operation. Balance of advantage. The T operation has higher likelihood of prompt success but higher risk: (1) in landing and (2) in early counterattack against beachhead. The Z operation has lower risk; less shock effect, and therefore less chance of quick success; equal chance of ultimate success. The T operation absolutely requires tactical air support and does not require air bases. Balance strongly favors Z.

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ADMIRAL BURKE: The Joint Chiefs did not agree to that position.

MR. DULLES: No, I think that's true, but it was prepared with [REDACTED] the military staff that had been assigned to us.

STATEMENT: I think that must be where Mr. McNamara got his impression that the Chiefs really preferred the Zapata plan.

QUESTION: Were you satisfied with the air plan as finally approved for Zapata?

MR. DULLES: I never considered myself a military expert. I deferred very largely on these matters to the military people. I'm not trying to shed any responsibility here because I assume full responsibility, but as a practical matter I am not a military man; I never got beyond being a Private in Company L in the New Jersey Militia.

STATEMENT: You're the only man in Washington that admits that he is not a military man.

MR. DULLES: Throughout this, I was one of those responsible for getting military men into our shop. We did not have a naval fellow for a long while, and I went down to look over our small boat operations to Cuba, and I thought they were lousy. So I came back and said you have to have a naval fellow here to advise on this operation, [REDACTED] I had asked General Cabell as a high Air Force officer, and again I don't want to shift any responsibility but just to give you the background, to follow closely the air side of the operation, and I deferred very largely to him on these matters. I realized however that you can't have amphibious landings if the other side has control of the air.

QUESTION: Do you recall whether or not Ambassador Willauer raised the point in the Special Group that he thought jet planes should be brought in to provide air cover for the B-26s?

MR. DULLES: I don't specifically recall that. Does the record bear that out?

- 5 -  
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RESPONSE: Yes, it shows that it was discussed.

MR. DULLES: Well, I wouldn't have been at all surprised. It was generally in line with my own thoughts on the matter.

QUESTION: Mr. Willauer said it was rejected by State on the grounds that it could not be fitted in with the covert requirements.

MR. DULLES: And it would have to be American, because due to distances, there was no way we could maintain an air cover from Nicaragua. We had ruled out the idea that we could call upon or rely upon American support.

QUESTION: I gather you thought you had surrounded yourself with air and military experts whom you had expected to watch this aspect and since you didn't hear any loud cries from them, you assumed the air situation was adequately taken care of.

MR. DULLES: That's right.

MR. DULLES: My idea of the Zapata D-Day air plan was that these airstrips would be secured around one or two o'clock in the morning and that therefore it could be maintained that strikes made after that time had originated from these fields; consequently the air strikes could have been conducted at dawn.

ADMIRAL BURKE: That's exactly right. That was our understanding.

QUESTION: Would you remind us of when you left and when you returned?

MR. DULLES: Yes, sir. I left Washington around 3 o'clock, Saturday afternoon before D-Day. I returned to Friendship Airport about one o'clock in the morning on D+1. I was met there by some of my people who brought the reports to me of what had transpired on D-Day. It was unfortunate, and probably unwise to have been away. However, I had planned this for over a year. I was sort of the main attraction for this particular group. If I had dropped out at the last moment, unless I had gone to bed or a hospital, or feigned some illness, it would have been noted very clearly and would have been related to what was about

- 6 -

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to happen. I did consult some of my own people and I did advise the White House. I did not take it up in detail so they had no responsibility for saying, yes, go, but I did advise them that I was going, and I went. Now, looking back on it, it was a mistake. I had assumed though that there probably would be no change in the plan. I knew that the ships were to rendezvous the next night and that all the plans had been made and I did not anticipate any change in the plans until I could be back.

QUESTION: Do you recall the situation they portrayed to you at Friendship when you came in?

MR. DULLES: It was tragic.

QUESTION: How did they describe the situation?

MR. DULLES: They indicated that the invasion had failed.

QUESTION: Would you tell us your understanding of the guerrilla alternative at Zapata

MR. DULLES: I realized that the guerrilla alternative at Zapata was not as good as in Trinidad. However, I did not entirely exclude it. We had had reports from people that we believed were reliable that there were about 100 guerrillas not far away that might join up with those advance parachute troops that we were sending in.

QUESTION: Did you have a strong impression, as the President did, that this was really an out -- that this operation could not be very disastrous because if worse came to worst, the group could go into the hills and become guerrillas?

MR. DULLES: I did think there was quite a number who would go through the swamp and take up guerrilla activities. I don't think I ever thought that the major part of the force could get to the Escambray. That I did not think was likely, unless the landing was really a complete success and you had eliminated to a large extent the opposition coming down on those three roads so that you would have a chance to get out.

- 7 -

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QUESTION: What about water evacuation? Did you give that serious consideration as a possible alternative?

MR. DULLES: I felt that if the beachhead was established and we had control of the air and it was decided then that there was no future to the beachhead, then water evacuation was a possibility.

QUESTION: It was more of a deliberate decision after a successful landing rather than an emergency action?

MR. DULLES: Yes, that's right.

QUESTION: On the night of D+1, how clear of a picture did you have of the ammunition situation?

MR. DULLES: When I arrived at Friendship Airport, I was given an extremely discouraging view as to the situation at Red Beach. I did not at that time realize that Blue Beach was in the same situation. There was a potential shortage at Blue Beach, but the shortage that was reported was at Red Beach.

QUESTION: By the end of that day, D+1, do you recall your picture of the situation?

MR. DULLES: It was desperate.

QUESTION: Do you want to comment on the non-attribution factor we've talked about so much?

MR. DULLES: Well, as I've said before, it seemed to me that a major mistake was not having recognized as early as November that the non-attribution character of this operation had been lost. Then or shortly thereafter the press articles began to appear about the training, and it was then that the decision was made to move from a guerrilla operation which was characteristic of a really covert operation, into a more strictly military operation. I think it's quite clear that at that time I had the duty to make it apparent to higher authority that the operation had lost its covert character. I think possibly that this was not done, because we were all discussing these developments in the 5412 Committee and later with President Eisenhower and still later with President Kennedy. However, I didn't say,

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now this is a new type of operation; we have to look at it in a new way; and I did not make that clear to President-elect Kennedy when Bissell and I briefed him in November in Palm Beach, nor later during the various meetings at the White House in March.

QUESTION: Were you aware of any effort to sell this operation by these enthusiastic young operators who were planning it?

MR. DULLES: Well, I'm always conscious of the fact, it's come up so many times in our work, that the proponents of an operation always try to sell it. It's part of human nature. They spend a lot of time developing a plan, and they are enthusiastic about its possibilities. Yes, I think I was aware of their trying to sell the operation because we've always had it. It's inherent in this type of operation. At the same time, I realized that the Agency had the final responsibility for the operation. I think I was too prone to deprecate my own military judgment. I should have exercised more of my own judgment in pointing out clearly to the President certain of the features which have been brought out in these discussions. The President once did ask me directly whether he should go ahead on this. I said I'd give it further study. I wasn't ready to approve it then because of the difficulty we were having in obtaining naval cover. Later, this was worked out and I recommended that we go ahead; so I take full responsibility there.

QUESTION: General Cabell and Mr. Bissell seemed to feel that they were directed to take up all operational matters with the Secretary of State.

MR. DULLES: Yes, that was our general view, that Mr. Rusk spoke for the President with regard to policy considerations which permitted or inhibited certain types of actions. Let me go back to the fact that on the 5412 Committee we looked to State representatives to tell us whether this could or couldn't be done.

- 9 -

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ULTRANSENSITIVE



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EYES ONLY

QUESTION: Do you think that after D-Day, CIA did not have direct access to the President?

RESPONSE: General Cabell and Mr. Bissell would say, yes, but their understanding of procedure was that the Secretary of State was acting on these things in the name of the President.

MR. KENNEDY: I just note that I was there during those few days and they were in continuous presence. Mr. Bissell was talking with the President practically continuously. All the decisions that were made, were made by the President. They weren't made by Dean Rusk.

STATEMENT: Yes, but I gather that when D-Day started, there were a number of requests for relaxations of the ground rules, and that the senior CIA representatives felt they should go to State, and if they didn't get through there, they didn't go directly to the President.

MR. DULLES: They went directly to the President at 4:30 in the morning, you remember?

RESPONSE: Yes, that one time.

MR. DULLES: But after that, they certainly had very good access to the President. The President never cut off access at any time.

QUESTION: Would you say then that the CIA leadership encountered no buffer in presenting operational requirements to the President?

MR. DULLES: No, never.

QUESTION: Do you have anything else you would like to put into the record?

MR. DULLES: I have been considering the organization within the CIA for this type of operation. It is obvious that any paramilitary operation of any consequence requires constant attention and it requires the fixing of responsibility. It is also obvious that I cannot spend all my time on any one operation. I am responsible for carrying on the work of the Agency. On the side of the production of intelligence there are many requirements, and we have operations and decisions to make all around the world, and someone has to make

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those decisions, so it is not possible for me, even if I were qualified, to be the commander in chief of every paramilitary operation, and I therefore believe in delegation of authority, and I did delegate it. Maybe I delegated too much in this particular operation, but I'm not sure that my judgment would have been sounder than those who made the decisions, but it was quite true that I did not follow every detail of this operation. As I indicated, everyday I would set down orally and in writing, a lot of questions that I had in my own mind about whether or not they had considered different things. We've had bad luck several times. We have a good deal of technique and a good deal of capability in air operations. We have a certain amount and growing capability in the small guerrilla type land operations, but particularly on the amphibious side, we haven't had much experience and the experience that we've had has not been successful. Consequently, the thing I was most apprehensive about was the question of getting the Brigade from X to Y and getting them there with their supplies. We did have this Task Force; I think the men in that Task Force were competent; I think we should have had even more constant connection with the Defense Department than we did even though General Gray was extremely useful and there most of the time. I may have had it in my mind more than I should have that we were getting the best possible advice from Defense. I think I should have looked into this situation and seen exactly how much responsibility was being taken by Defense and how much was being taken by the head of our Task Force -- Mr. Bissell, Mr. Barnes, and the Task Force itself.

ADMIRAL BURKE: How much did our people know? There were lots of things they didn't know about.

MR. DULLES: Why didn't they know, Arleight? We didn't hold out anything. It may have been by ignorance we didn't tell them everything.

- 11 -

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ADMIRAL BURKE: That's right. It wasn't a question of deliberately holding out. [REDACTED] One man can't be awake all the time, although he was your lad, and Gray was over there quite a bit, he wasn't over there all the time and just by the virtue of not having enough people, there would be holes in the information.

MR. DULLES: [REDACTED]

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILES  
COUNTRIES  
CUBA

SUBJECTS - PARAMILITARY STUDY GROUP REPORT  
(Taylor Report)

PART III

Annexes

Box 61b.

INDEX OF ANNEXES AND OPERATIONS MAPS


ANNEX NO.	SUBJECT	# OF Class.
<del>1</del> <u>3/88</u>	<del>"A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" (Approved by the President on 17 March 60)</del>	<del>11</del> <u>4</u> <del>S</del> <u>ts</u>
<del>2</del>	<del>"Brief History of RADIO SWAN" from CIA</del>	<del>5</del> <u>5</u> <del>S</del> <u>S</u>
<del>3</del>	<del>Memo from CIA, 17 May 61, Subj: "Chronology of the Development and Emergence of the Revolutionary Council"</del>	<del>2</del> <u>2</u> <del>1/2</del> <u>82</u>
<del>4</del>	<del>Cable to the CIA [REDACTED] Senior Project Representative in Guatemala, 4 November 60</del>	<del>5</del> <u>5</u> <del>1/2</del> <u>S</u>
<del>5</del>	<del>Chart showing organization set up in CIA for execution of the Plan</del>	<del>1</del> <u>1</u> <del>S</del> <u>S</u>
<del>6</del>	<del>Chart showing organization set up in CIA for planning and preparing Cuban operation</del>	<del>1</del> <u>1</u> <del>S</del> <u>S</u>
<del>7</del>	<del>JCSM 44-61, "U.S. Plan of Action in Cuba"</del>	<del>5</del>
<del>8</del>	<del>President Kennedy's First Briefing on Operation TRINIDAD on 28 January 61</del>	<del>2</del>
<del>9</del>	<del>JCSM 57-61, "Military Evaluation of the CIA Paramilitary Plan Cuba"</del>	<del>39</del>
<del>10</del>	<del>Report by Three Joint Staff Officers to JCS on "The Military Effectiveness of the Cuban Expeditionary Force at its Guatemala Base during 24-27 February 61" Approved on 10 March 61.</del>	<del>25</del> <u>25</u> <del>1/2</del> <u>TS</u>
<del>11</del>	<del>Mr. Bissell's paper entitled, "Proposed Operation Against Cuba" which summarized action to 11 March 61</del>	<del>12</del> <u>12</u> <del>TS</del>
<del>12</del>	<del>JCSM 166-61, "Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba"</del>	<del>13</del>
<del>13</del>	<del>Record showing that the Chiefs considered the plan as a body only four times after March 15 while the plan was in the formative stages</del>	<del>5</del>
<del>14</del>	<del>[REDACTED] Memo to Chief, WH/4 [REDACTED] 4 January 61, "Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba"</del>	<del>8</del> <u>8</u> <del>1/2</del> <u>S</u>
<del>15</del>	<del>Working Group paper containing agreed tasks for assignment to the various agencies of the Federal Government (23 March)</del>	<del>12</del>
<del>16</del>	<del>Report of 12 April Conference with President, Secretary of State, and other NSC officials</del>	<del>4</del> <u>4</u> <del>1/2</del> <u>7</u>
<del>17</del>	<del>Letter from CIA, 31 May 61, Subj: "What briefing, if any, was given the Brigade or the Brigade's staff on going guerrilla?"</del>	<del>5</del> <u>5</u> <del>1/2</del> <u>S</u>
<del>18</del>	<del>[REDACTED] message, 13 April 61, re Evaluation of Brigade for action</del>	<del>2</del>



		<del>12</del> <u>U</u>
		PAGES CLASS.
EXEMPTED 3/85, SANITIZED NLK-93-13, 10/95	CIA Outline, Subj: "Propaganda Action Plan in Support of Military Forces (D-Day until the fall of the Castro regime.)"	12 SC
SANITIZED 3/85		
<del>20</del>	<del>Memo from Mr. Morrow to General Taylor, 25 April 61, (from Donald Wilson with Draft Memo to General Taylor)</del>	<del>3</del> <u>U</u>
EXEMPTED 3/85, SANITIZED NLK-93-13, 10/95	Cuban Internal Situation 18 May 1961	10 S
20 A		
EXEMPTED NLK-93-13, 4/95	Map showing agents and assets	1 S
20 B		
DECLASSIFIED		
<del>21</del>	<del>Mr. Bissell's and General Cabell's Memo of 9 May 61 re visit to Secretary Rusk's Office on 16 April</del>	<del>3</del>
SANITIZED		
<del>22</del>	<del>Sequence of Events D-2 to D+2 and Organization and Operation of the Command Post</del>	<del>14</del> <u>U</u>
	<del>Operations Map #1 "Planned disposition of Forces"</del>	<del>14</del> <u>S</u>
	<del>Operations Map #2</del>	
	<del>Operations Map #3</del>	
<del>23</del>	<del>[REDACTED] Memo, 26 April 61, Subj: Air Activities and Sequence of Events, aircraft, crews, missions flown, support drops, pilot training and support units.</del>	<del>19</del> <u>U</u>
DECLASSIFIED		
<del>24</del>	<del>Supply data</del>	<del>15</del>
"		
<del>25</del>	<del>Ammunition Available to the Brigade</del>	<del>1</del>
"		
<del>26</del>	<del>Rations</del>	<del>1</del>
SANITIZED		
<del>27</del>	<del>[REDACTED] After Action Report, 4 May 61</del>	<del>29</del> <u>U</u>
"		
<del>28</del>	<del>Report from wounded pilot evacuated from Cuban Airstrip by C-46, 31 May 61</del>	<del>5</del> <u>U</u>
"		
<del>29</del>	<del>U.S. Navy Rules of Engagement Operation "BUMPY ROAD" from CNO</del>	<del>32</del> <u>U</u>
DECLASSIFIED		
<del>30</del>	<del>Pre-strike and Post-strike communications - circuit charts</del>	<del>2</del>



# PARAMILITARY STUDY



**Secret**

"EYES ONLY"

ULTRASENSITIVE

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Authority: NLK-76-139

copy no. 1



1

①

**EYES ONLY**  
~~SECRET~~

This document is our basic policy  
paper. It was approved by the  
President at a meeting in the  
White House on 17 March 1960.

**EYES ONLY**  
~~SECRET~~



EYES ONLY  
~~SECRET~~

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

- a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba.

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2

(Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.

(Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition.

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3

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

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[REDACTED]

(Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**EYES ONLY**

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1.

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a.

b.

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**EYES ONLY**


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PROPAGANDA

1.



2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S. -controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region.



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3.

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5.

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EYES ONLY  
~~SECRET~~

Tab C

I.

II.

III.

IV.

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EYES ONLY  
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2

c.

d.

e.

EYES ONLY  
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EYES ONLY  
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Brief History of Radio Swan

1. On 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower approved a covert action program to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime. Within the propaganda framework of that program, an important objective was to create and utilize a high-powered medium and short wave radio station. CIA was asked to provide such a station, outside the continental limits of the United States, and have it ready for operation within sixty (60) days.

2. Swan Island, in the Caribbean, was chosen as an appropriate site. The United States Navy furnished CIA with splendid support: within sixty days, equipment had been brought from a landing strip was cleared on the island, and the station was able to go on the air on 17 May of the same year, precisely on schedule.

3. Originally it was planned that Radio Swan would be a clandestine station

Just prior to inauguration, however, it was decided the station should be a commercial one. This was at the request of the Navy, which reasonably argued that should their participation in construction of a black facility be known, explanations would be difficult.

4. Using a "commercial" station for the tactical and strategic tasks envisaged for Radio Swan is not, of course, the most desirable way to support a covert operation. The only practical method of operation is to "sell space". Thus, program time on Radio Swan was sold to various Cuban groups. These included organizations of workers, students, women, two publications in exile, two radio

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stations in exile, and several political groups.

Programs (on tape) were produced in \_\_\_\_\_ and later, on Swan Island.

5. Radio Swan effectively reached not only its target area of Cuba, but the entire Caribbean as well. Soon after broadcasts began Castro started jamming, but was successful in hindering reception only in the City of Havana. Scores of letters were received from all parts of Cuba to show that the station had listeners. As late as March 1961, a survey was made to determine the extent of listening coverage. An inexpensive ballpoint pen was offered to those listeners who would write in to the station. The reply was immediate: almost 3,000 letters from 26 countries. This barrage of mail included significant amounts from all parts of Cuba.

6. As Radio Swan progressed, it became the symbol of the anti-Castro effort within Cuba and of opposition to Castro throughout the hemisphere. Toward the end of 1960, the effectiveness of Radio Swan began to diminish. Although great numbers of Cubans still listened to the station, its credibility and reputation began to suffer as the result of statements representing the selfish interests of the Cuban groups producing the various programs. In the first place, these groups talked overmuch about their activities in Miami and the hard fight they were conducting along Biscayne Boulevard. Naturally, the Cubans who were suffering under the Castro dictatorship within Cuba resented this. Secondly, the Cuban programs became a fulcrum where the individual political ambitions of Cuban exiles in Miami were presented to the other Cubans in Miami, forgetting the all-important target audience within Cuba. Finally, each program fought

EYES ONLY

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**EYES ONLY**~~SECRET~~  
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with the other for "scoops". As time passed and the Cubans found that their sources of information were no better than the next fellow's, the program producers began to exaggerate in order to give their broadcasts a touch of sensationalism. They made statements which were obvious lies to the listeners. An example: One of the announcers stated that there were 3,000 Russians in a park in Santiago de Cuba -- the residents had only to walk to the park to see that this was untrue. Moreover, the various programs began to defy coordination. All programs but one told the Cuban militiaman that he would be a hero on the day that he defected from Castro. The sole exception told the Cuban militiaman that he would be hanged regardless of what he did.

This action failed to achieve proper control.

7. As this unfortunate situation developed, the military operation was about to be launched. It was obvious that CIA could not allow uncoordinated programming to continue while the station attempted to provide tactical support to military forces. On the 27th of March 1961 each program producer received a letter from the management of Radio Swan informing him of the termination of his program. Broadcasting was not suspended. Rather, it was immediately replaced with a new, overall programming schedule--more broadcasting hours than before.

Thus Radio Swan was converted into a station which

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provided the Cuban people with straight news as well as a program which stated its only function was to assist those who were fighting Castro within Cuba. This was the beginning of an intensified propaganda campaign directed against Castro. Within a few days after the change, Radio Mambi, a Cuban government station, said to its listeners, "the hysterical parrots of Radio Swan have recently raised their voices scandalously." On the day following these declarations by Radio Mambi, President Osvaldo Dorticos declared in a speech over another radio station, "Cubans must be alert for lies and attempts to destroy the revolution through psychological warfare." A Cuban newspaper, at the same time, repeated Dorticos' statement: "our enemies are intensifying psychological warfare to find weak points in our domestic front."

6. During the military action in Cuba, Radio Swan was used in tactical support of the strike force

Radio Swan was monitored by hemisphere radio stations and by world news services, and was an important factor in presenting the desired picture of the fighting in Cuba to world opinion. Despite some press allegations, Radio Swan was not responsible for the wild rumors during those hectic days.

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EYES ONLY

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(14)

9. When it became obvious that the main attack on Cuba had been unsuccessful, Radio Swan deliberately anticipated Castro's victory statement by admitting that the Cuban Expeditionary Force had been stopped by Communist armament, but that many of the Freedom Fighters had been able to join resistance groups in the hills. Radio Swan then returned to a calm presentation of straight world news and over a period of one week changed from round-the-clock broadcasting to a normal schedule, avoiding all program content designed to incite the Cuban people. The producer of the consolidated program was instructed to present programs with a minimum of emotional content, but to continue the anti-Castro orientation through the selection of news items. At the present time, Radio Swan is broadcasting simultaneously over medium and short wave daily from 0500 to 0800, from 1230 to 1400, and from 1800 to 0015 (E.S.T.). The broadcasts are made up of hourly news, and other commercial programs including the relay of

Neither

during nor after the strike phase has there been any criticism of Radio Swan from any country other than Cuba and the United States.

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2



EYES ONLY  
~~SECRET~~

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EYES ONLY  
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EYES ONLY  
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(14)

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Neither

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EYES ONLY  
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28



17 MAY 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Development and Emergence of the Revolutionary Council

1. As Castro's true position became progressively more apparent in the first half of 1959, much consideration was given by the State Department here and "The Country Team" in Havana to the possible posture of U. S. policy toward Cuba. The general conclusion reached in the latter part of 1959 was that any group or coalition of groups which could hope to supplant the Castro regime could gain popular acceptance only on the basis of continuing the revolution with more practical management and less nationalist, socialist and Marxist contact; the United States would have to disassociate itself from Batista elements which would rush to undo the revolution. Elements within the Department of State catalogued actual or potential opposition to Castro as follows:

- a. The Autenticos (Antonio de Varona).
- b. The Monticristi (Justo Carrillo).
- c. Triple A (Sanchez Arango).
- d. Catholic Labor and Youth.
- e. Ex-26 July Members.
- f. Ex-Batista elements.

2.

3. As the project approached its stage of formalization, i.e. approval on the highest governmental level, the possible composition of a "junta" was discussed on the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State level. After the project was approved on 17 March 1960, the Department was kept fully informed of each step leading to the eventual formation of the FRD on 11 May 1960 and its advice on personalities and substance was sought regularly: There was no objection to the original Varona, Carrillo, Rasco, Artime (and later Sanchez Arango) constellation. Coordination with the Department continued throughout the entire project: In September 1960 the Department's advice was sought on the inclusion of additional personalities into the FRD Executive Committee, such as Manuel Ray; in January 1961 the problems inherent in the establishment of a "Provisional Government" were discussed both in terms of personalities and substance; on 13 February 1961 approval was received for the establishment of a Revolutionary Council with the understanding that there should be no U.S. interference and that the Cubans were to nominate anyone they saw fit as

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Council President; also, the President was to be free to select his own Council members. The current Council composition is the result of this understanding. (Biographies of FRD and Council members were previously transmitted to General Taylor.)

4. The FRD political platform and the Revolutionary Council's programs

In the early stages of the project general FRD utterances fell into the broad category "restore the revolution." Later the FRD and Council statements became more specific. By and large, the tenor and posture of the Council and FRD is liberal and fairly progressive; its legal framework is the 1940 Cuban Constitution; land reform is part of its program as is the possible nationalization of certain industries. None of the Council members desires to turn the clock back; there are naturally differences among the Cubans as to detail and pace for future actions.

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(179)

31 May 1961

SUBJECT: Report from Wounded Man Evacuated from  
Playa Giron Airstrip by C-46.

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 14 May 1961.

1. The wounded man, \_\_\_\_\_, eva-  
cuated from the airstrip by C-46 at 0530 local 19 April  
carried no written report from the Brigade Commander.

2. The foregoing was verified on 24 May 1961 through  
discussion with \_\_\_\_\_, who would have been  
the recipient of a written report had such existed.  
Additionally, a discussion with ROBERTO PEREZ SAN ROMAN,  
brother of the Brigade Commander and himself the Commander  
of the Heavy Gun Battalion, indicated that although the  
Brigade Commander was writing a report, it was not complete  
and did not leave with the man evacuated from Blue Beach.  
It was intended that it be transmitted via a subsequent  
flight which, of course, did not occur.

3. An attempt was made to debrief pilot \_\_\_\_\_ on  
his return from Blue Beach. He was slightly wounded, but  
physically exhausted from lack of food and sleep and emo-  
tionally shaken by the events which had transpired.  
\_\_\_\_\_ indicates that subject frequently lapsed  
into Spanish.

4. A recording was made of the remarks of pilot \_\_\_\_\_  
which was subsequently returned to Headquarters. A trans-  
scription has been made of this tape at Headquarters, and  
the result is attached herewith. This tape was made within  
two hours of the pilot's return from Blue Beach.

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## Statement of/

I am the pilot of the B-26 #915 that was shot down on the morning of the 17th at 10:30 in the morning. I take off from (garbled) base at about 4:00 in the morning. Supposed I am to go to Red Beach to try to support our infantry men that was taking care of the beach. About 7:00 in the morning I was over the beach with another B-26, (name garbled) was the other pilot. About 7:30 we received a message from one that was from our Chief that say that Castro fighters was hitting our ship. We go over there. I saw (name garbled) was fighting with one Sea Fury No. 545. I go in against the Fury, too, and we go (garbled phrase) but the Fury left and return to Havana Airport. Later on we come back to the Red Beach again and then I saw one T33 and one B-26 hitting our ships. Mr. (name garbled) left already because he have very low fuel and I stay along over our Red Beach and Blue Beach. About 8:00 I saw a 33 and a 26 flying over our ship. Hit him with a rocket and a machine gun. I go in the tail of the 26 and I shoot him down. The 26's number 903. It was about 9:00. He hit already in the Cochinos Bay. Both pilot was dead because they cannot make a parachute jump. About 5 minutes later after I shot down the 26 I saw one 33 that come in from about 10,000 to 12,000 feet over my head. Made a dive and he hit me with a 50 caliber machine gun. My right engine was put out and I got the smoke in my cockpit. I try to come back to our field in Blue Beach. I try to make a landing over there and when I come in there to make a pass the 33 made another pass over my aircraft so I lost all my control. I got smoke, flame, and my left engine was black with smoke. I try to come in final but I haven't any control in the aircraft so we hit the left side of the runway more than 140 miles per hour without any control. The aircraft was exploding already and when I opened my eyes I was more than three hours in the hospital. My co-pilot was already dead. My co-pilot name was Lt. (garbled) (garbled), he is already dead. Dr. (name garbled) was the Cuban doctor that was taking care of us here at the hospital told me that some guy that belonged to our country picked me up about 20 feet of my aircraft. I was almost burning up from the flame and they sent me to the hospital. After it was about 3 hours, about 3:00 in the afternoon,

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- 2 -

(garble) out because they gave me some shots, some morphine. and then I go to the Headquarters of our Commander in the Beach. Over there, I saw, it was about 4:30, one was our B-26. It was shooting down the T33. Our 26 made a pass against the militia troops and dropped his bomb. Later on when he returned to the beach, and tried to make another pass, the 33 come in and he stay and our 26 exploding already over the Blue Beach about 2 miles to the coast. This night, all the whole day Monday the Castro aircraft made about 10 rides over our troops. Between 7:00 in the morning to 6:00 in the afternoon all the day 3 T-birds and 2 B-26 and one Fury was flying over our heads all day. Later on about 6:00 the Castro aircraft leave already, but they send 30 tanks on the Red Beach headquarters, and 30 from the east side of the Cienfuegos highway. So we can't move because we have 30 tanks in the left, 30 tanks on the right. Our troops began to make a retreat back because they was about between 9,000 to 11,000 and we was only about 1,000 men. I talked with the Navy chief, because I was in with the headquarters commander about 6:30 and we say that we can hold if the Navy can make any neutralization of the Castro air force. They say that we need to hold our position, they are over here and we are over there so we hold our position. The second day in the morning the Castro aircraft come in at 6:30 in the morning and begin again a raid on our troops. We lost in the first raid 42 men. These 42 men, 25 was lost shooting at the Castro air force. At 6:30 the second day, between 6:00 to 6:30 begin the second ride. The second day was Tuesday and continue all the day. Our troops continue to make a retreat because they come in too much. They come in with about 9,000 to 11,000 men. And Mr. Pepe San Roman, that was the chief of our troops, talking again with the Navy and say that we need to deter the Castro aircraft or we are lost already. The Navy said that they would send over there some aircraft and about 5:00 this afternoon I saw 3 Navy aircraft fly in formation over the Blue Beach. They made three passes and go away to the ship. Five minutes later the Castro aircraft come in and make another raid over our people. That night the Castro men continue the advance over our troops. We can't make too much because we are very low in parts, we don't have 50 caliber, and we don't have too many bazooka

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- 3 -

grenades--we are very short in ammunition. So we continue to retreat. That night I personally was taking care of our airport, I personally shot two militia who try to make a penetration of the airport. One of them got a 38 (garble) and the other got a Czech machine gun. One of them said he got a communist card that say that he belong to the Socialista party. In Cuba we call this Communist. The other was a militia. About 8:00 in the night I was talking again with our chief, that was Pepe San Roman, and he told me that our aviation can't mean anything to our troops, the Castro headquarters commander was in Red Beach, we can't hold 48 hours. We send a message to the ship that our aviation 26 may arrive this afternoon. This morning the 26 would try to make a raid in the Red Beach. I saw about 4:00 about 3 of our B-26 made drop--a bomb-- over Red Beach. But about 20 minutes later I saw one T33 was shooting down our B-26 near Blue Beach about 5:30 to 6:00 on my watch over there. I saw they was shooting down so Pepe San Roman told me again that we can't send any more B-26 because they will shoot down all that we send. He told me that we call again to the Navy and say that send quickly the (garble) and the (garble) and everything they got over there because in another minute, we can't hold more than 24 hours. We are continuing to run out of ammunition. We don't have anything that the doctor can take care of the guys that was shot, we don't have any bandages, we don't have anything. My personal flight suit was taken by Dr. (name garbled) to try to make some bandage, because they don't have anything over there to fix the guys that were shot. About 6:30 in the morning one of our aircraft that was flown by Captain (name garbled) was landing at our airport. He picked me up. Five minutes before I was talking with San Roman give me all the map and all the positions and he say to me to tell to come in quick with the air force because in another minute we can't hold 24 hours. Tell him he need to retrieve Red Beach and Central Covocongá. They have more than 9,000 militia. Tell that through Red Beach and Covocongá we gain the war in three days, so they can't say anything more against us. But tell him too that if he don't come quickly we are already lost. Five minutes later I made it from the aircraft, so I don't know what happened. I had seen the retreat before, because it was the second day there. I was

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- 4 -

over there about 4:30 to 5:00 I saw six B-26 made a raid on the highway going from the Blue to the Red Beach over there. They made a nice pass and I seen that they killed more than 200 Militia and destroyed two tanks and a lot of trucks. But when our troops begin to move because the Militia is beginning to run away already when we begin to bomb over there when our troops begin to move against the Militia. Five minutes later come back again the Castro air force so we need again to retreat. And another thing I want to add is that the first day before I was a fighter with the B-26 I shot two trucks with Militia. I made a low pass and I saw in the first truck coming a lot of Militia with Czech machine gun and the second truck coming with Militia and Castro rebels in front. I don't want to shoot the first one because I know that there was a woman about 14 to 18 years old, but my compatriot told me that had commenced shooting, so I shoot them maybe 6 or 7 times but I already destroyed the second truck that was coming.

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15.

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THE ATLANTIC COMMAND  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

Special 00029/61  
28 March 1961

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MEMORANDUM

From: Admiral R. L. DENNISON  
To: General L. L. LEMNITZER

Subj: CIA Operation CROSSPATCH

Ref: (a) Your memo CM-152-61 of 24 Mar 1961

1. I will be prepared to execute the missions directed in enclosures A, B and C of reference (a). I will be prepared also to reinforce the Naval Base at Guantanamo with a reinforced Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Caribbean Amphibious Squadron.

2. Instead to provide at least two destroyers instead of one for the convoy. The purpose of providing two is for mutual support, defense against possible coordinated surface and air attack, and in case units of the convoy become separated.

3. The following is a summary of forces in the area and their planned employment:

a. The antisubmarine carrier ESSEX with seven destroyers is scheduled to be conducting ASW operations in the Gulf of Mexico during the period 3-18 April. About 7 April a squadron of jet aircraft will be flown aboard ESSEX. The ASW group will then proceed to an area southwest of Cuba. The convoy destroyers and combat air patrol will be provided from this group. The control of the combat air patrol may be exercised from the ships best situated and equipped at the time and as directed by the Commander of the ASW Group or ESSEX.

b. There will be 18 destroyer types conducting routine training operations in the Guantanamo area during the two week period commencing 3 April.

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x On file in Joint Secretaries

TAB A



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c. PHIBRON-2 with BLT 1/6 embarked will be operating in the area south of Guantanamo preceding a scheduled visit to Jamaica 13 April.

d. One jet fighter or attack squadron will be conducting routine training operations in the vicinity of each of the following bases:

Guantanamo

Key West

4. I request that the JCS inform GINGNORAD of these plans in order that Florida may be protected from possible retaliatory attack.

5. There is a necessity for issuing specific "rules of engagement" orders to units involved. Therefore, with your concurrence, I intend to issue the following instructions:

a. In executing the destroyer mission a DD commanding officer will:

(1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Cuban surface craft sighted.

(2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, fire a warning shot across his bow.

(4) If he continues to close the convoy to 2000 yards or he opens fire on the convoy, open fire on him persisting until he surrenders, retires, or is destroyed.

b. In executing the combat air patrol mission pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

(1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of the convoy and closing will be investigated.

(2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Cuban the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Cuban aircraft is aware of his presence.

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(3) If Cuban aircraft maintains course to close the convoy CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

(4) If Cuban aircraft insists in closing and takes position to attack the convoy it will be fired on until it retreats or is destroyed.

6. It is noted that the subject of your memorandum is "CIA Operation CROSSPATCH". Since a number of my staff and various others in the Atlantic Command associate this code name with establishment of SWAN ISLAND radio last year it is suggested that this term not be used by DOB personnel when referring to the current operation.

*R. L. Dennison*  
R. L. DENNISON

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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

SM-363-61

1 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL R. L. DENNISON, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,  
ATLANTIC

Subject: "BUMPY ROAD"

Reference: Your memo Special 00029/61, dated 28 March  
1961, Subject: "CIA Operation CROSSPATCH"

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the contents of  
the reference memorandum and have concluded the following:

a. The assignment of an additional destroyer as escort  
for the convoy is approved.

b. The disposition and employment of LANTCOM forces in  
the general area is considered normal and will insure  
the readiness of your command in case of an emergency.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff letter of instruction\*\*  
for the subject operation is now before the Secretary of  
Defense for approval. That letter, which is also addressed  
to you, provides for informing CINCONAD of his requirements.

d. Your rules of engagement are approved. It was also  
noted that no mention was made of Soviet submarines.  
Your current instructions in regards to Soviet submarines  
will apply for attack. In the event the convoy is  
shadowed or closed by a surfaced submarine, it will be  
treated under the rules for engagement as a surface ship.  
If the convoy is shadowed or closed by a submerged  
submarine;

(1) Request submarine identify itself.

(2) If identity refused.. Repeat request stating  
its actions considered hostile and attack will be  
made if identity not given.

(3) If identity still refused, assume submarine  
is attacking force and attack with all authorized means

\* Enclosure B

\*\* Appendix B to JCS 2304/24

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JCS 2304/26

186

Enclosure A

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TAB B



available until submarine retires, surfaces and  
identifies itself (thereby coming under rules of  
engagement for surface ships), or the submarine is  
destroyed.

-2. It will be noted that the nickname "BUMPY ROAD" has  
now been applied to the CIA Para-military Plan. This nick-  
name is assigned with the concurrence of CIA.

3. You will be kept informed of any changes in requirements  
and/or schedule for the subject operation resulting from the  
final review.

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JCS 2304/26

187

Enclosure A

~~TOP SECRET~~



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CM-179-61  
7 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral R. L. Dennison, USN  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command

Subject: "BUMPY ROAD"

References: a. CM-152-61 Dated 24 March 1961, Subj:  
CIA Operation CROESPATCH  
b. CINCLANT Memo Serial Special 00029/61  
Dated 28 March 1961  
c. SM-363-61 Dated 1 April 1961

Enclosures:

- A. DD Support
- B. LSD Support
- C. Combat Air Patrol
- D. Navigational Reference Points
- E. Individual Ship Movement Schedule  
(Code Name)
- F. Instructions for DD Escort and CAP

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from this  
Copy*

*W. Mitchell  
L. S. V.*

1. Reference a requested certain naval support for the subject para-military operation. Due to required changes in concept of movement of surface units, the requirements for U. S. Naval support as set forth in reference a are superseded by those contained in Enclosures A, B, and C hereto.

2. Enclosures D and E contain the required navigational and individual ship movements information for the ships of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

3. It is necessary to take precautions to assure that U. S. support of the Cuban Volunteer Force is not apparent and that support for this operation be undertaken so that the United States may

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TAB C



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possibly deny participation. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to modify the instructions for the escorting destroyers and the combat air patrol. Accordingly, the specific "rules of engagement" as set forth in references b and c are superseded by the instructions contained in Enclosure F hereto.

4. D-Day is now scheduled for 17 April 1961.

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: Admiral Burke, CNO  
Director, J-5  
(Attn: Col Shuler, SAD, J-5)

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1. The US destroyers providing the area coverage of the Cuban Volunteer Force ships will take the following precautions to avoid overt association with ships of the Cuban Forces:

a. During daylight hours they will maintain maximum practicable range ahead of the ships of the Cuban Force and maintain a patrol using courses and speeds so as to provide protection but not appear to be screening the Cuban Force ships.

b. During the hours of darkness the US destroyers are permitted to take station with respect to the Cuban Force ships to provide adequate protection.

c. US Naval support will not be used to support the landing operation. The US destroyers covering the transport ships of the Cuban Force will not close within 20 miles of the target area. After withdrawal of the SAN MARCOS from Point OLDSMOBILE, the US destroyers will withdraw to Point PACKARD and rejoin the US Naval Task Group.

2. The surface and subsurface special rules of engagement are as follows:

a. Prior to redactions of the Cuban Force ships:

(1) If intervention by US forces is required to protect the Cuban Force ships from attack or to prevent their capture, the US forces will intervene as necessary to protect the Cuban Force ship(s).

(2) This intervention will cancel the landing operation and the US destroyers will take measures short of firing on the Cuban Force ships, to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS upon receipt of the report of intervention.

(3) Subsequent to the intervention and withdrawal, the US destroyers will maintain close escort of the Cuban Force to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order.

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(4) U. S. forces will open fire only if the Cuban Force ship(s) is attacked.

b. After rendezvous of the Cuban Force ships at 1730 R, D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will:

(1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Cuban surface craft sighted.

(2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect the Cuban Force ships, then follow instructions set forth in paragraph 2a(2) and (3) above.

c. Intervention by US destroyers after Cuban Force convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist the SAN MARCOS at her request.

3. The combat air patrol mission pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

a. The CAP will take station so that it will not give the appearance of covering the ships of the Cuban Force.

b. The "rules of engagement" are as follows:

(1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of the Cuban Force ships and closing will be investigated.

(2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Cuban, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Cuban aircraft is aware of his presence.

Enclosure F

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(3) If Cuban aircraft maintains course to close the Cuban Force ship(s) CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

(4) If Cuban aircraft insists in closing and attempts to take position to attack the Cuban Force ship(s), the CAP aircraft will open fire if the Cuban aircraft commences to fire on the Cuban Force ship(s) or if it opens its bomb bays and commences its bomb run.

Enclosure F.

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DRAFT 4/13/61

TO: ADMIRAL DENNISON EXCLUSIVE

1. Original concept for U.S. Naval support of Bumpy Road was to ensure that when once embarked this operation must not fail. This concept modified by the plan which provides that cancellation possible until landing phase actually starts. Concept further modified by provision in Rules of Engagement that if intervention by U.S. military element is required and actually takes place while CEF en route to transport area then operation must abort.

2. In view above a change of emphasis is now required. That is, it is now important that premature ( ) U.S. intervention not occur which would be the cause for cancellation of this highly important and desirable operation.

3. To this end it is important to success of operation that commanders of all sea and air units of your forces engaged in protection of expedition clearly understand and apply rules of engagement along following lines:

a. It is desired to minimize the need to abort the operation, because of U.S. engagement of Castro ships or aircraft in conduct of protective mission assigned to you.

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TAB D

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b. Actual engagement of Castro ships or aircraft should be withheld until last possible moment and action taken only after it becomes clear that otherwise total destruction of friendly ship or ships may be imminent. For example, non-engagement in event of initial straffing or bomb run by Castro aircraft on ship friendly is acceptable rather than too hasty U.S. intervention with resultant need to abort the whole operation. Same applies importantly to intervention by U.S. surface ships. Initial firing on friendly ship by Castro surface ship is acceptable and U.S. engagement of Castro ship should await evidence that Castro ship is honing in for a kill.

c. Preliminary maneuvering of U.S. aircraft or ships should take into account the above. Effort should be made to minimize blowing the operation by overly active intervention.

4. In the event actual U.S. engagement of Castro craft takes place, immediate report should be passed to Washington together with salient facts involved. Particularly desired are any facts which would support argument that it could be plausibly denied that U.S. intervention was in direct support of CEF.

5. In summary, hope is that over-all operation will not rpt not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantial risks.

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TO: JCS		FROM: JCS		SUBJECT: DA 994221		CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
INFO: CIG C1.135		DA 994221		DA		EQUIPMENT	
<p>1. On 17 April CEF aircraft will be limited to defense of beachhead from air and ground attack. Limited Cuban aircraft patrol activity in area expected.</p> <p>2. Be prepared to execute on order following missions as soon after first light as practicable throughout daylight hours 17 April:</p> <p>a. Provide Air Cap for CEF shipping outside territorial waters. Rules of engagement as stated in your OP Plan apply as applicable.</p> <p>b. Provide EW for CEF ships to include LCI's for purpose of warning ships of approaching aircraft.</p> <p>EW ships should remain maximum distance off shore consistent with capability to communicate with CEF ships.</p> <p>3. This is a warning order.</p>				<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>BURPV ROAD Distribution plus</p> <p>CIS</p> <p>ACTION</p> <p>DATE 27</p> <p>TIME 1961</p> <p>APR</p>			
SYMBOL		TITLE		SIGNATURE		DATE	
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DAVID W. GRAY, Major General, USA		DAVID W. GRAY, Major General, USA		DAVID W. GRAY, Major General, USA		DAVID W. GRAY, Major General, USA	
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(Apr 61)

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REPLACES CSG FORM 375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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TAB E



UNIT COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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FORM 375-4 RE PLATE CDS FORM 375-4 1960-11-11 WHICH MAY BE USED

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TAB F



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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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CINCLANT

SENT JCS 994247 From <sup>JCS</sup> Director,  
Staff. <sup>SEAD</sup> EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON. BUMPY ROAD.

ACTION.

INFO

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ships when headed toward ship to be protected or  
starts a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made  
by US aircraft under any other condition.

b. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from  
Cuban territory.

c. US aircraft shall not come up close to un-  
friendly aircraft except when attacking it.

d. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every  
effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action  
has occurred.

3. The JCS interpret the foregoing to mean that  
you will establish a safe haven for friendly ships a  
C minimum of fifteen miles off shore.

ORIGIN: JCS

JCS 994247

(APR 61) DTG: 172005Z

PAGE 11-2

ENC/10

DD FORM  
1 AUG 51

375-4

REPLACES DD FORM  
1744 1 MAR 51 WHICH  
MAY BE USED

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~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

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MESSAGE

STAFF COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

PRIORITY <b>URGENT FLASH</b>		TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK <input type="checkbox"/> MULTI <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input type="checkbox"/>		AGEING STAGE	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE 1
FROM: <b>JCS</b>						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS <b>JCS 12 COPIES</b>
TO: <b>CINCLANT</b>						
INFO: <b>CTG 81.8</b>						
<p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p><b>994309</b> From JCS. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON AND ADM CLARK FROM GEN GRAY.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. With unmarked naval aircraft fly photo and <b>RECONNAISSANCE</b> requirements ASAP to determine situation on beach.</li> <li>2. 12 Castro tanks reported on RED BEACH operating against Cuban revolutionaries. We need data on situation ASAP.</li> <li>3. Use officer observers with amphibious experience if quickly practicable, to give us <b>best</b> judgement of situation. There may be Castro MIGs in area.</li> <li>4. Aircraft protect themselves from attack. Take all possible precautions to avoid having operations identified as US. Make complete and frequent reports. More later.</li> </ol>						
SYMBOL: <b>J-5</b> TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) <b>DAVID W. GRAY, Maj Gen, USA</b> PHONE: <b>54590</b> PAGE: <b>1</b> NR. OF PAGES: <b>1</b> SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: <b>TOP SECRET</b>						DATE: <b>18</b> MONTH: <b>Apr</b> YEAR: <b>1961</b>
SIGNATURE: <i>David W. Gray</i> TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE <b>DAVID W. GRAY</b> <b>Major General, USA</b> <b>Chief, Subsidiary Activities Div.</b> <b>J-5</b>						

ORIGIN: JCS

JCS 994309

(APR 61) DTG: 101837Z

PAGE 12

ENC/10

GCS FORM  
1 AUG 51

375-4

REPLACES GCS FORM  
375-1 MAY 51, WHICH  
MAY BE USED.~~TOP SECRET~~REPRODUCTION  
PROHIBITED

TAB H

C



MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

SYMBOL		TYPE MSG (COVER)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	DA	
FROM: CINCINCLANT		EXCLUSIVE				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 12 copies to JCS
TO: CINCINCLANT						
INFO: CTG 31.8						
<del>TOP SECRET</del> JCS DA994317 From JCS. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON AND ADM CLARK FROM GEN GRAY.						ACTION
1. Following preparatory actions directed at high-level conference in light of loss of RED BEACH, tank and air attack on BLUE BEACH and reported four Castro T-33's and three Castro MIGs in action.						INFO CJCS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Dir JS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Navy <input type="checkbox"/> Dep Sec <input type="checkbox"/> J-1 <input type="checkbox"/> J-2 <input type="checkbox"/> J-3 <input type="checkbox"/> J-4 <input type="checkbox"/> J-5 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> J-6 <input type="checkbox"/> J-7 <input type="checkbox"/> J-8 <input type="checkbox"/> J-9 <input type="checkbox"/> J-10 <input type="checkbox"/> J-11 <input type="checkbox"/> J-12 <input type="checkbox"/> J-13 <input type="checkbox"/> J-14 <input type="checkbox"/> J-15 <input type="checkbox"/> J-16 <input type="checkbox"/> J-17 <input type="checkbox"/> J-18 <input type="checkbox"/> J-19 <input type="checkbox"/> J-20 <input type="checkbox"/> J-21 <input type="checkbox"/> J-22 <input type="checkbox"/> J-23 <input type="checkbox"/> J-24 <input type="checkbox"/> J-25 <input type="checkbox"/> J-26 <input type="checkbox"/> J-27 <input type="checkbox"/> J-28 <input type="checkbox"/> J-29 <input type="checkbox"/> J-30 <input type="checkbox"/> J-31 <input type="checkbox"/> J-32 <input type="checkbox"/> J-33 <input type="checkbox"/> J-34 <input type="checkbox"/> J-35 <input type="checkbox"/> J-36 <input type="checkbox"/> J-37 <input type="checkbox"/> J-38 <input type="checkbox"/> J-39 <input type="checkbox"/> J-40 <input type="checkbox"/> J-41 <input type="checkbox"/> J-42 <input type="checkbox"/> J-43 <input type="checkbox"/> J-44 <input type="checkbox"/> J-45 <input type="checkbox"/> J-46 <input type="checkbox"/> J-47 <input type="checkbox"/> J-48 <input type="checkbox"/> J-49 <input type="checkbox"/> J-50 <input type="checkbox"/> J-51 <input type="checkbox"/> J-52 <input type="checkbox"/> J-53 <input type="checkbox"/> J-54 <input type="checkbox"/> J-55 <input type="checkbox"/> J-56 <input type="checkbox"/> J-57 <input type="checkbox"/> J-58 <input type="checkbox"/> J-59 <input type="checkbox"/> J-60 <input type="checkbox"/> J-61 <input type="checkbox"/> J-62 <input type="checkbox"/> J-63 <input type="checkbox"/> J-64 <input type="checkbox"/> J-65 <input type="checkbox"/> J-66 <input type="checkbox"/> J-67 <input type="checkbox"/> J-68 <input type="checkbox"/> J-69 <input type="checkbox"/> J-70 <input type="checkbox"/> J-71 <input type="checkbox"/> J-72 <input type="checkbox"/> J-73 <input type="checkbox"/> J-74 <input type="checkbox"/> J-75 <input type="checkbox"/> J-76 <input type="checkbox"/> J-77 <input type="checkbox"/> J-78 <input type="checkbox"/> J-79 <input type="checkbox"/> J-80 <input type="checkbox"/> J-81 <input type="checkbox"/> J-82 <input type="checkbox"/> J-83 <input type="checkbox"/> J-84 <input type="checkbox"/> J-85 <input type="checkbox"/> J-86 <input type="checkbox"/> J-87 <input type="checkbox"/> J-88 <input type="checkbox"/> J-89 <input type="checkbox"/> J-90 <input type="checkbox"/> J-91 <input type="checkbox"/> J-92 <input type="checkbox"/> J-93 <input type="checkbox"/> J-94 <input type="checkbox"/> J-95 <input type="checkbox"/> J-96 <input type="checkbox"/> J-97 <input type="checkbox"/> J-98 <input type="checkbox"/> J-99 <input type="checkbox"/> J-100 <input type="checkbox"/>
a. Prepare unmarked Navy planes for possible combat use. Number suitable in view of above left to your discretion. This instruction in addition to earlier message regarding recce mission. Amphibious group move to within four hours steaming of landing area. Prepare unmarked boats for possible evacuation of anti-Castro forces.						
2. New subject. We are operating almost entirely in the dark. Forward assessment of situation as you see it.						DATE 18 MONTH Apr YEAR 1961
SYMBOL J-5		TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		SIGNATURE		
DAVID W. GRAY, Maj. Gen., USA		DAVID W. GRAY		DAVID W. GRAY		
PHONE 64500		PAGE NO. 1		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: <del>TOP SECRET</del>		NO. OF PAGES 2		DAVID W. GRAY		
				Major General, USA		
				Chief, Subsidiary Activities Div.		
				Chief, J-5		

JCS 994317

(APR 61)

PAGE NR. 1

GCS FORM  
1 AUG. 55

375-4

REPLACES GCS FORM  
375-4, 1 MAR 55, WHICH  
MAY BE USED.

TOP SECRET

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TAB I



information at all would be helpful.

3. FYI There is no intention of intervening with  
process.

IGIN: JCS

PAGE NR. 2

S 994317

(APR 61) DTG: 181949Z

EMC/12

375-4 REPLACES OCS FORM  
37-4 1 MAR 51, WHICH  
MAY BE USED.

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MESSAGE

STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCUATING SYMBOL	CHAR. CLAS. TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	DA	
X				

FROM: JCS

TO: CINCLANTFLT

CTG 81.8

EXCLUSIVE to Adm Dennison and RADM Clark from JCS Bumpy Road.

~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS XX 994369

1. TG 81.8 to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF forces during period 0630 to 0730 local time 19 April to defend CEF against air attack from Castro forces. Do not seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack. Do not attack ground targets. Pilots carry as little identification as practicable. If necessary to ditch, ditch at sea.

2. CEF transport aircraft, to include C-45, C-54 and possibly C-130 types, are scheduled to air drop supplies to CEF forces in beachhead from 190630R to 190730R. Friendly B-26's are scheduled to attack Castro tanks and forces in vicinity of beachhead during

DATE 19 MONTH APR YEAR 1961 TIME 1334R

STYLER JCS

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)

PHONE

PAGE 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

CHARLES E. KEIR

COL, USAF

JCS DUTY OFFICER

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

12 copies to JCS

JCS 994369

(Apr 1)

PAGE 1

TOP SECRET

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T A B J



MESSAGE  
SAME period.

3. / will land on beach by small boat during same period for consultation with CEF commander.

4. CEF very short of supplies and are being requested by other agencies to break out from beach as soon as practicable either as organized force or as small bands of guerillas. If this is not possible it may become necessary to evacuate CEF forces as last resort. Should this be necessary will probably use CEF ships but have PHIBRON 2 in position about 30 miles from beach by 191300R prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue beach or other designated beach at 191700R using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees so that they will not be easily identified on beach. If evacuation by U.S. ships ordered furnish air cover to protect landing craft and keep amphibious shipping not less than five miles from beach so as not to indicate U.S. ships are involved. What is latest time you will need executing order to evacuate at 191700R?

5. Make frequent reports after operation begins.

6. New subject. Furnish air cover to CEF ships more than 15 miles from coast as practicable.

ORIGIN: JCS

JCS 994369

(Apr 61) DTG: 190837Z

PAGE HR

crp/6

OCF FORM  
1 AUG 61

373-4

REPLACES OCS FORM  
1 JUL 51, WHICH  
MAY BE USED.


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~~TOP SECRET~~

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE		TYPE (CPS)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	CPS LIMITED	ROOM	MULTI	SINGLE		
INFO	OPS LIMITED		X		DA	
FROM: JCS					EXCLUSIVE	
TO: CINCLANT					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
INFO: CTG 81.8					Distribution 12 copies to JCS	
<del>TOP SECRET</del> JCS 994382 From JCS. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION: BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON AND ADM CLARK FROM GEN GRAY.						
1. Confirmed phone conversation with Adm Burke send 2 destroyers off BLUE BEACH to determine whether there is any chance of evacuation or not. 2. Fly reconnaissance over beach to determine situation. 3. CEF ships have been ordered to move to beach. 4. Fly air cover for destroyers, CEF shipping and own air reconnaissance. This means active air to air combat against any aircraft in the area. You will be notified of time of any future friendly B-26 aircraft in area. No attack against ground forces authorized. 5. Report immediately by fastest means possible results of reconnaissance. Final instructions will be sent later.						
SYMBOL		J-5		SIGNATURE		DATE
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		DAVID W. GRAY, Maj Gen, USA				19
PHONE		54500		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		MONTH
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		TOP SECRET		DAVID W. GRAY Major General, USA Chief, Subsidiary Activities Div. J-5		YEAR
						Apr 1961

ORIGIN : JCS

JCS 994382

(Apr 61) DTG: 191657Z

PAGE 1R  
bja/8GDS FORM  
1 AUG 51

375-A

REFLECTS GDS FORM  
11-41-21 WHICH  
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TAB K



## MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFF.

PRECEDENCE	1701 100	TYPE MSG (CHREF)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFLAS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
OPS-INTD FLASH	OPS-INTD FLASH	✓	DA		
FROM:	JCS	EXCLUSIVE			
TO:	CINCLANT				
INFO:	CTG 81-8				
<p><del>TOP SECRET</del> JCS DA994392 From JCS. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON AND ADM CLARK FROM GEN GRAY.</p> <p>1. Direct DD to take personnel off the beach and from water to limit of their capability. We are anxious to save people as long as you can do so. We are extremely reluctant to become engaged but as long as we have some prospects of saving significant number of people to make hazards worth while, save the people.</p> <p>2. Use CEF boats and craft as practicable. Provide air cover. If DD fired on <sup>they</sup> <del>you</del> are authorized to return the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission.</p> <p>3. Report when on the way and frequently thereafter.</p>					
SYMBOL		DATE			
J-5		19			
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		MONTH			
DAVID W. GRAY, MAJ GEN.		Apr 11			
PHONE		YEAR			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		19			
PAGE NR.		SIGNATURE			
NR. OF PAGES		DAVID W. GRAY			
RELEASER		TYPED (or recorded) NAME AND TITLE			
		d			

JCS 994392

(Apr 61)

PAGE NR

OCS FORM 375-4  
1 AUG. 51.

REPLACES OCS FORM 1701, 1 MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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TAB C



## MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

FORM 375-4

4. If in your judgement there are substantial numbers that can be evacuated inform us ASAP, so that we can announce here that US will assist in evacuation. Naval commander in full charge of evacuation. Instructions to that effect are being sent by CIA to CEF commander. GOD be with you.

ORIGIN : JCS

PAGE 12

JCS 994392

(Apr 61) DTG: 191812Z : bjm/8

OCS FORM  
1 AUG 61

375-4

REPLACES OCS FORM  
375-4, 1 MAR 61, WHICH  
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**EXCLUSIVE**12 copies  
to JCS

TO:

CINCLANT

INFO: CTG 81.8

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 994465 From JCS. LIMITED

DISTRIBUTION. BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON  
AND ADM CLARK FROM GEN GRAY.

Existing instructions in respect to air and surface protection remains in effect. No further requirement for air CAR in beach head area. Direct Phil Ron 2 resume normal operations. Continue reporting in accordance with BUMPY ROAD instructions.

DATE	TIME
10	
MONTH	YEAR
APR	1961

WRITER	SYMBOL J-5		RELEASER	SIGNATURE <i>David W. Gray</i>		
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) DAVID W. GRAY, MAJ GEN. USA			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE DAVID W. GRAY		
	PHONE 54590	PAGE NR. 1		NR. OF PAGES 1	Major General, USA	
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET</del>			Chief, Subsidiary Activities Div., J-5		

ORIGIN: JCS

JCS 994465

(Apr 61) DTG: 200152Z

PAGE NR  
W33/1OCS FORM  
1 AUG 51

375-4

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1 JUL 51 WHICH  
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4

TAB M




## MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

Ref

PRECEDENCE		TYPE AND CLASS		POLYGRAPH		CROSS REFERENCE TO	
OCS IMMEDIATE		VOICE	PLAIN	TELETYPE	DA		
FROM: JCS							
TO: CINCLANT							
INFO: CTG 81.8							
COMCARIESEAERON							
CONKWESTFOR							
COMNAVBASE CTMO							
TOP SECRET JCS 994569							
From JCS. LIMITED							
DISTRIBUTION. BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON							
INFO: RADMS CLARK, SMITH MCLEROY AND O'DONNELL FROM GEN GRAY.							
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Following is in order to indicate continuing US support for the counter revolutionary committee and for a Free Cuba.</li> <li>2. Take charge CEF ships and personnel and get them safely to Vieques. Navy on scene commander can relay message to CEF ships via me.</li> <li>3. Conduct destroyer patrol off Blue Beach for tonight for possible evacuation of survivors and instruct</li> </ol>							
SYMBOL		DATE		TIME			
J-5		20					
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		MONTH		YEAR			
DAVID W. GRAY, MAJ GEN, USA		Apr		61			
PHONE		PAGE		DNR. OF			
54590		1		PAGES		2	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION							
TOP SECRET							
TOP SECRET							
SIGNATURE							
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		DAVID W. GRAY Major General, USA Chief, Subsidiary Activities Div., J-5					

JCS 994569

(ATTN: G1)

PAGE 1

OCS FORM 375-4  
1 AUG 51

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03

 DECLASSIFIED  
 PUBLISHED IN FRUS 1961-63  
 VOL X DOC # 142m  
 By MMIS NARA, Date 4/19/96



# MESSAGE

CO he is authorized to ground his ship if it will  
facilitate mission. Use of amphib ship and craft  
authorized in addition to DD if desired. Repeat patrol  
tomorrow night approaching area within sight of land but  
outside gun range prior darkness. Provide air cover.  
Rules of engagement during patrols same as before.  
4. Mallards boss has directed CEF ships to divert  
to Vieques. They may require logistic support in addition  
to protection.

ORIGIN: JCS

JCS 394500

REF ID: A67 210040Z

GCS FORM 375-4  
1 AUG 51

REPLACES GCS FORM  
375-4 WHICH  
MAY BE USED.

TOP SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET~~

CO he is authorized to ground his ship if it will facilitate mission. Use of amphib ship and craft authorized in addition to DD if desired. Repeat patrol tomorrow night approaching area within sight of land but outside gun range prior darkness. Provide air cover.

'Rules of engagement during patrols same as before.

4. Mallards boss has directed CEF ships to divert to Vieques. They may require logistic support in addition to protection.

ORIGIN: JCS

PAGE NR 2

JCS 994569

(APR 61) DTG: 210046z

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement Operations "BUMPY ROAD"

1. On 24 March 1961 the Chairman of the JCS informed CINCLANT (CM 152-61) of the requirements for naval support for CIA Operation Crosspatch. This was a requirement for one destroyer to escort the CEF ships on D-2 and D-1 days to the transport area (about 3 miles off-shore). The destroyers were not to close within three miles of Cuban territory. There was also a requirement for an LSD to deliver landing craft (3 LCU's and 4 LCVP's) to the transport area and a requirement for U.S. naval air cover over the CEF ships from 0600R on 9 April to sunset that day. (Note: D-Day was then scheduled for 10 April 1961.)

2. On 28 March 1961 Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT, proposed rules of engagement to General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS. (CINCLANT memorandum serial Special 00029/61, subject: CIA Operation Crosspatch. TAB A) These rules pertained to the destroyers assigned to escort the CEF ships on D-2 and D-1 and for the combat air patrol pilots and air controllers assigned CAP missions over the CEF ships on D-1. CINCLANT also stated that he intended to provide two destroyers for the convoy in place of the one previously requested. The rules of engagement which he proposed were essentially that the escorting U.S. forces attempt to warn off any approaching Cuban aircraft or ships and if the Cuban aircraft or ships persisted in their approach the U.S. forces were to open fire when the Cuban aircraft or ships reached a position to attack or attacked the CEF ships.

3. On 1 April 1961 the JCS approved the rules of engagement submitted by CINCLANT. The JCS noted that CINCLANT had not proposed any rules of engagement for submerged submarines and the JCS added rules for such an eventuality. The rules of engagement for a submerged submarine were to attack any unidentified submarines shadowing or closing the convoy if it refused to identify itself. (SM 363-61 dated 1 April 1961, TAB B.)

4. On 2 April the Secretary of Defense was briefed on the Bumpy Road situation and advised as to the approved rules. He was further advised by the JCS that after the President had made a firm "go ahead" decision, these rules should be submitted to the President for his approval. The Secretary of Defense felt that the rules were allowed too much interpretation at lower level and stated that the JCS should study the matter further.

5. On 4 April, after the conference with the President the Secretary of Defense requested that the JCS reconsider the rules of engagement to insure that the U.S. would not become overtly engaged with Castro forces.

6. At a meeting at the White House at 0830 R on 5 April between the Secretary of Defense, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Bissell and General Cabell, the rules of engagement were discussed in more detail, and it was agreed that the rules should definitely spell out the President's desire that if United States forces were required to protect CEF ships from damage or capture the operation would be aborted and the CEF ships directed to a port to be designated by the JCS.

7. The conference with the President on 6 April touched upon the revised rules of engagement principally to the effect that if United States naval forces were required to protect CEF ships from damage or capture the operation would be aborted. Based upon this conference CIA modified their requirements for naval support. This modification was basically the result of the decision that CEF ships should proceed independently rather than in convoy to the objective area.



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8. On 7 April 1961, the CIA sent a memorandum to General Gray, JCS Liaison Officer, modifying the U.S. Naval support requirements. These modifications were for destroyers to provide area coverage (instead of convoying the CEF ships) from 0600 R on D-2 to the transport area. The LSD requirement was unchanged. The requirement for U.S. naval air cover was changed to provide air cover over the CEF ships from 0600R to sunset on D-2 and D-1. (One extra day of air protection). D-Day was changed to 17 April 1961.

9. On 7 April 1961 the Chairman, JCS sent CINCLANT the revised rules of engagement based upon the above modifications and conferences (CM 179-61) (TAB C). Enclosure F to this memorandum gave the revised rules of engagement. The changes to the rules pointed out the necessity for avoiding any sign of U.S. participation. The U.S. naval air cover was to be flown in such a manner that the planes did not appear to be covering the CEF ships. During daylight hours the escorting destroyers were to maintain maximum practicable range ahead of the CEF ships and to use courses and speeds so that they provided protection but didn't appear to be screening the CEF ships. During the hours of darkness the destroyers could close the CEF ships to provide adequate protection. The destroyers were not to approach within 20 miles (instead of the previous 3 miles) of Cuban territory and, as soon as the San Marcos (the LSD) had withdrawn from the transfer area for the landing craft, the destroyers were to withdraw to join the U.S. naval task group (about 125 miles from Blue Beach). The rules of engagement were modified so that U.S. naval units would not open fire on Cuban ships or aircraft until they opened fire (or opened bomb bays and started a bombing run) (Note: Sea Furies and T-33's do not have bomb bays) on the CEF ships. In essence, the U.S. protecting forces could only open fire if the CEF was attacked. (Instead of opening fire when a Cuban ship or aircraft made a threatening move). If the U.S. forces intervened to protect the CEF ships, the operation was automatically cancelled. U.S. Forces were then to take all steps short of firing on the CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS. This memorandum was dispatched to Admiral Dennison by special courier, on 8 April 1961. The naval task group was already at sea and had made an ASW sweep of the sea area off Nicaragua.

10. On 13 April, General Cabell discussed with General Bonesteel and General Lemnitzer the rules of engagement set forth in CM 179-61. He was particularly concerned that U.S. naval forces might intervene before seriously needed, thus forcing abandonment of the operation. Accordingly, a message (TAB D) was prepared which was cleared with Admiral Russell, USN, General Dean, J-3, and Admiral Wellings Deputy Director, Joint Staff and then approved by General Lemnitzer. This message was dispatched on the afternoon of 13 April to Admiral Dennison by SSO channels and may be summarized as follows:

"In summary, hope is that over all operations will not repeat not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantive risks."

11. The above rules of engagement remained in effect until 0422R, 17 April when CINCLANT was directed (JCS 994221) (TAB E) by the JCS to be prepared to provide CAP for CEF shipping outside territorial waters and Early Warning (EW) for CEF ships. At 0530R (approx) 17 April Mr. Bissell called and stated approval was received from the White House for only the employment of an EW vessel. These instructions were dispatched (JCS 994222) (TAB F) to CINCLANT at 0550R. The rules of engagement for the U.S. naval forces remained the same as previously stated except that the EW destroyers were not to close within 30 miles of Cuban territory.

12. At 1530, 17 April based upon a CIA request which had Presidential approval, the JCS directed (JCS 994247) (TAB G) CINCLANT to establish a safe haven for CEF ships with U.S. naval air cover over the CEF ships in accordance with the following restrictions:

- "a. Carrier ship operation no closer than 50 miles from Cuban territory.
- b. Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory.
- c. No more than 4 aircraft on station at one time."

Further, CINCLANT was instructed that the rules of engagement were modified as follows:



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"a. U.S. aircraft shall attack if unfriendly aircraft makes aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed towards ship to be protected or start a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by U.S. aircraft under any other condition.

b. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory.

c. U.S. aircraft ship shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft except when attacking it.

d. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has occurred."

Note that the above rules of engagement still give a tactical advantage to the attacking Cuban aircraft before they can be taken under fire by the U.S. forces.

✓ 13. At 1337R, 18 April, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed (JCS 994309) (TAB H) CINCLANT to conduct a photo and visual reconnaissance using unmarked naval aircraft as soon as possible to determine the situation on the beach. The aircraft were authorized to protect themselves from attack and were to take all precautions to avoid being identified as U.S.

✓ 14. Based upon a call from Admiral Burke at the White House the JCS at 1449R, 18 April directed (JCS 994317) (TAB I) CINCLANT to prepare unmarked naval planes for possible combat use. The number to be left to CINCLANT's discretion. Further, to prepare unmarked naval boats for possible evacuation of CEF forces. CINCLANT was advised in this same message that there was no intention of U.S. intervention.

✓ 15. At 1957R, 18 April the JCS informed (JCS 994363) CINCLANT of the possibility that C-130 aircraft with U.S. Air Force markings removed might be used for night drops on Blue Beach the night of 19 April. (These air drops by C-130 were never conducted).

✓ 16. Upon the request of CIA and with the approval of the President after a conference at the White House, the JCS at 0334R, 19 April directed (JCS 994369) (TAB J) CINCLANT to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF forces during the period 0630 to 0730 local time 19 April to defend the CEF against air attack from Castro planes. He was directed to not seek air combat but to defend CEF forces from air attack. Further to not attack ground targets. (Note: The purpose of this CAP was to provide cover to CEF transport and B-26 type aircraft which were due at the beachhead during this period.) In this same message CINCLANT was directed to be prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue Beach using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees and that if the evacuation by U.S. ships were ordered he was to furnish air cover to protect landing craft.

✓ 17. At 1157R (JCS 994382) (TAB K) the JCS confirmed a telephone call to CINCLANT made by Admiral Burke at 1020R upon orders from the White House directing CINCLANT to send two destroyers to a position off Blue Beach to determine possibilities for evacuation. CINCLANT was also directed to fly reconnaissance over the beach to determine the situation. No ground attacks was authorized but active air to air combat was authorized.

✓ 18. On 19 April at 1312R, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed (JCS 994392) (TAB L) CINCLANT to have destroyers take CEF personnel off the beach and from the water to the limit of their capability; use CEF boats and craft as practicable; provide air cover; if destroyers fired on they are authorized to return the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission. (Note the reason that amphibious force craft were not used was that PHIBRON 2 had not yet arrived off the objective area.)



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✓ 19. At 2052R, 19 April the JCS informed (JCS 994465) (TAB M) CINCLANT that existing instructions in respect to air and surface protection for CEF ships remain in effect. This was the safe haven for CEF ships 15 miles or more off-shore. No further requirement for an air CAP in the beachhead area.

20. On 20 April, upon direction of the President to Admiral Burke the JCS at 1946R directed (JCS 994569) (TAB N) CINCLANT:

✓ "a. Take charge of CEF ships and personnel and get them safely to VIEQUES. Navy on scene Commander can relay message to CEF ships via me.

b. Conduct destroyer patrols off Blue Beach tonight for possible evacuation of survivors and instruct CO he is authorized to ground his ship if it will facilitate mission. Use of amphibious ship and craft authorized in addition to DD if desired. Repeat patrol tomorrow night approaching area in sight of land but outside gun range prior to darkness. Provide air cover. Rules of Engagement during patrols same as before." These rules are to open fire only in self-defense.




G. A. MITCHELL  
CDR, U.S. NAVY



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
# PHASE I (pre-strike)





SECRET

# PHASE II (post-strike)





CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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31 OCTOBER 1960

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REF:

1. PLAN EMPLOY NOT OVER 60 MEN FOR REF TEAMS. REMAINING TRAINING FOR ASSAULT FORCE. INSTRUCTIONS RE THIS FORCE AND RESERVE FORCE FOLLOW.
2. ASSAULT FORCE WILL CONSIST ONE OR MORE INFANTRY BATTALIONS EACH HAVING ABOUT 600 MEN WITH THREE INFANTRY COMPANIES, WEAPONS COMPANY AND HQS AND SERVICE COMPANY.
3. MISSION OF ASSAULT FORCE IS SEIZE AND DEFEND LOCUMENT IN TARGET BY AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ASSAULT AND ESTABLISH BASE FOR FURTHER OPS. AUTOMATIC SEA AND AIR RESUPPLY WILL BE PROVIDED.
4. ASSAULT FORCE TO RECEIVE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TRAINING IN SEQUENCE AS FOLLOWS: INDIVIDUAL TRAINING, BATTAL, PLATOON AND COMPANY TRAINING, FOLLOWED BY BATTALION FIELD AND COMBAT POST EXERCISES. OFFICER AND NCO SCHOOL WILL BE HELD IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS OF PLATOON, COMPANY AND BATTALION USING SPANISH VERSIONS FIELD MANUALS 7-10 COMPANIA DE FUSILEROS, 7-20 BATTALION DE INFANTERIA AND 7-15 COMPANIA DE ARMAS DE ACOMPAÑAMIENTO AS BASIC TERMS. ADVISE ROYAL LATER. ALL INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS MUST

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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ENCLOSURE 10 4/31



1. PLAN EMPLOY NOT OVER 60 MEN FOR REF TEAMS. REMAINING TRAINEES  
ASSAULT FORCE. INSTRUCTIONS RE THIS FORCE AND RESERVE FORCE FOLLOW.

2. ASSAULT FORCE WILL CONSIST ONE OR MORE INFANTRY BATTALIONS EACH  
AVING ABOUT 600 MEN WITH THREE INFANTRY COMPANIES, WEAPONS COMPANY AND HQS  
D SERVICE COMPANY.

3. MISSION OF ASSAULT FORCE IS SEIZE AND DEFEND LODGEMENT IN TARGET BY  
PHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ASSAULT AND ESTABLISH BASE FOR FURTHER OPS. AUTOMATIC  
A AND AIR RESUPPLY WILL BE PROVIDED.

4. ASSAULT FORCE TO RECEIVE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TRAINING IN SEQUENCE  
FOLLOWS: INDIVIDUAL TRAINING, SQUAD PLATOON AND COMPANY TRAINING, FOLLOWED  
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BATTALION DE INFANTERIA AND 7-15 COMPANIA DE ARMAS DE ACOMPAÑAMIENTO AS BASIC  
EXTS. ADVISE RQMENTS LATTER. ALL INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS MUST

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[1]



DIRECTOR

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INFO

CITE DIR

-2-

BE FIRED. INDIVIDUALS AND CREWS KEEP GUNS WEAPON THROUGHOUT TRAINING  
AND OPS.

5. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING DIRECTIVE WILL BE  
POUCHED OR DELIVERED BY HQ3 REP AMB.

6. POSSIBILITY USING U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING CADRE FOR  
ASSAULT WORK WERE FINISHED. WERE NOTED.

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20 KGT

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ANNEX 4

- 2 -

BE FIELD FIRED. INDIVIDUALS AND CREWS KEEP SAME WEAPON THROUGHOUT TRAINING AND OFS.

5. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING DIRECTIVE WILL BE POUCHED OR DELIVERED BY HQS REP ASAP.

6. POSSIBILITY USING U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING CADRES FOR ASSAULT FORCE BEING PURSUED. WILL ADVISE.

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ANNEX 4

- 2 -

BE FIELD FIRED. INDIVIDUALS AND CREWS KEEP SAME WEAPON THROUGHOUT TRAINING AND OFS.

5. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING DIRECTIVE WILL BE POUCHED OR DELIVERED BY HQS REP ASAP.

6. POSSIBILITY USING U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING CADRES FOR ASSAULT FORCE BEING PURSUED. WILL ADVISE.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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INFO

CITE DIR

ANY NEW MEN REQUIRES DETACHED APPROX 100 NOW AND FROM FIRST WEEK NOV  
WHICH YOU INDICATE CAN RECEIVE. REPORT NUMBER BEYOND 100 YOU CAN HANDLE WITH  
INFO

*12/11/78* *REPORT RECOMMENDED* *REPORT*  
FROM THE THREE MEN AND WOMEN HAVE TWO FAMILIES AS SITUATION INSIDE  
MEXICO REMAINS. CONDITIONS INSIDE MAY DEGRADE SIGNIFICANTLY. EXISTING TEAM  
RECOMMENDED AND FOR OTHER DUE TO HAVANA AND LAS VEGAS.

*12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78*  
DO NOT PLAN STRESS HERE THIS TIME ABOUT 1500 HRS. SMALLER FORCE HAS LITTLE  
CHANCE SUCCESS IN VIEW SITUATION IN TOWN. SUGGEST BEGIN PSYCHOLOGICAL  
PREPARATION READING COURSE FOR RECOMMENDED PERIOD. CAN ENCOURAGE  
TEAM BY FREQUENT COMMUNAL BEGGING SCENE SERVICE.

*13* *13* *13* *13* *13* *13* *13* *13* *13* *13*  
DO NOT PLAN STRESS HERE THIS TIME ABOUT 1500 HRS. SMALLER FORCE HAS LITTLE  
CHANCE SUCCESS IN VIEW SITUATION IN TOWN. SUGGEST BEGIN PSYCHOLOGICAL  
PREPARATION READING COURSE FOR RECOMMENDED PERIOD. CAN ENCOURAGE  
TEAM BY FREQUENT COMMUNAL BEGGING SCENE SERVICE.

WITH COMMENTS: Reports on *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78* *12/20/78*  
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# CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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## ROUTING

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INFO

CITE DIR

3-

AN NEED NEW RECRUITS BEYOND APPROX 100 NOW AND FROM FIRST WEEK NOV  
LESS YOU INDICATE CAN RECEIVE. REPORT NUMBER BEYOND 100 YOU CAN HANDLE WITH  
TO

12/11/78 *Report*  
FROM THE TEAM NOW AND FUTURE NEW RECRUITS AS SITUATION INSIDE  
WENT FAVORABLE. CONDITIONS INSIDE MAY DEGRADE LAUNCHOUT. THREATEN TEAM  
UNSTABLE AND FOR FURTHER DEL REO HAVANA AND LAS VILLAS.

12/20/78  
REQUIRE OF CODE NOW PLACED OFFICE RE FORTIFIED BEFORE SEVERAL MONTHS.  
3 NOT PLAN WENT WITH THIS TIME ABOUT 1500 HRS. SMALLER FORCE HAS LITTLE  
WENT SUCCESS IN VIEW SITUATION RE THREAT. SUGGEST BEGIN PSYCHOLOGICAL  
SEPARATION BETWEEN OFFICE FORCE FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CAN ENCOURAGE  
AND BY FRAGMENT INDIVIDUAL BIGGER SCALE STRIKE.

1/3  
REF PART 6 WILCO BUT NOT POSSIBLE DAILY BASIS. REPRESENTATIVE APPROVAL  
ABOUT TEAM OPERATIONS HEREIN. *AMERICAN IN* *PERSONAL*. WILL ADVISE.  
(END OF MESSAGE)

4TH Command: Reports on *operations* and requests guidance re ops plans.

C/11/1/78

C/12/1/78

C/13/1/78

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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[FORMAT INCORRECT  
CONSULT ORIGINAL WHICH FOLLOWS.]

SECRET

PLAN SEND NEW RECRUITS BEYOND APPROX 100 NOW SEND FROM [ ] FIRST WEEK NOV  
UNLESS YOU INDICATE CAN RECEIVE. REPORT NUMBER BEYOND 100 YOU CAN HANDLE WITH  
INFO [ ]

[LINE MISSING; CONSULT ORIGINAL.]

11. PLAN USE TEAMS NOW AND DURING NEXT TWO MONTHS AS SITUATION INSIDE  
TARGET PERMITS. CONDITIONS INSIDE MAY DICTATE STRETCHOUT. EARLIEST TEAM  
REQUIREMENTS ARE FOR PINAR DEL RIO HAVANA AND LAS VILLAS.
12. ASSAULT OF SIZE NOW PLANNED CANNOT BE READIED BEFORE SEVERAL MONTHS.  
DO NOT PLAN STRIKE WITH LESS THAN ABOUT 1500 MEN. SMALLER FORCE HAS LITTLE  
CHANCE SUCCESS IN VIEW SITUATION IN TARGET. SUGGEST BEGIN PSYCHOLOGICAL  
PREPARATION MEMBERS STRIKE FORCE FOR INTENDED TRAINING PERIOD. CAN ENCOURAGE  
THEM BY PROSPECT EVENTUAL BIGGER SCALE STRIKE.
13. NEW PARA 6\*\* WILCO BUT NOT FEASIBLE BIWEEKLY BASIS. TENTATIVE APPROVAL  
ABOVE PLAN OBTAINED WITHIN [ ] APPROVAL BY [ ] PENDING. WILL ADVISE.  
(END OF MESSAGE)

\* Comment: Reports on training progress and requests guidance re ops plans.

[AUTHORIZATIONS  
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
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5

# CHART OF COMMAND ORGANIZATION FOR PLANS AND TRAINING



Plans were generated in Headquarters, field commanders were consulted as required. Headquarters and field officers consolidated plans in conference.


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6

CHART OF COMMAND ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS



Orders were released by the Task Force Chief. Coordination was effected, with higher authority, as required.

\* In the case of the CEF Commander, the Task Force did not have command subsequent to the commitment of the Brigade. The Task Force role was one of support. This was understood by the Task Force and the Brigade Commander.

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